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Abstract 
 Difficult issues in negotiation act as interfering forces but their effects on negotiation 
processes and outcomes are unclear. Perhaps facing such obstacles leads individuals to take a step 
back, attend to the big picture and, therefore, to be able to craft creative, mutually beneficial 
solutions. Alternatively, facing obstacles may lead negotiators to focus narrowly on the obstacle 
issue, so that they no longer consider issues simultaneously, and forego the possibility to reach 
high quality, integrative agreements. Three experiments involving face-to-face negotiation 
support the “getting stuck” hypothesis, but only when negotiators are in a local processing mode 
and not when they are in a global processing mode. Implications for the art and science of 
negotiation, and for construal level theory, are discussed.  
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Getting Stuck or Stepping Back: Effects of Obstacles in the Negotiation of Creative Solutions 
 
When negotiating agreement, people oftentimes run into issues that are difficult to settle. 
Facing such obstacles may create conflict and frustration, and at least temporarily block progress. 
Yet the more long-lasting impact of facing obstacles is less obvious. Work on social cognition 
suggests that obstacles lead people to step back, to consider the bigger picture, and to generate 
creative solutions. Ironically, obstacles may thus facilitate the development of mutually beneficial 
agreements. However, this notion contrasts sharply with work indicating that one should begin 
with easy issues first, to create optimism and a sense of locomotion facilitating dealing with more 
difficult issues later on. In other words, obstacles may undermine constructive negotiation and the 
development of integrative agreements. Our goal was to examine whether and why obstacles help 
or hinder integrative negotiation. 
Obstacles Help Constructive Negotiation 
Obstacles are interfering forces (Higgins, 2006) that impede the standard course of action, 
can make the individual feel stuck, and motivate him or her to ignore, overcome, or get around 
them in order to move closer to some desired end-state or object. Lewin (1935) argued that 
obstacles require an initial movement away from the direct path to the goal in order to attain it. 
The solution to such a detour problem occurs by means of “restructuring” the field and perceiving 
the total situation “of such a kind that the path to the goal becomes a unitary whole” (p. 82 f).  
Obstacles thus force the individual to “step back” in order to see the big picture and how to reach 
the goal. Such a global processing style (i.e., seeing the forest rather than the trees) fosters 
creativity, whereas a local processing style (i.e., seeing the trees rather than the forest) helps 
analytical problem solving (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004).  
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That obstacles trigger a shift towards global processing and promote creativity is 
consistent with work on temporary impasse in negotiation. Such impasses lead parties to realize 
that their current (competitive) strategy is unsuccessful and may result in not reaching an 
agreement at all. Because such would be undesirable, parties reflect on alternative approaches 
and switch to a more cooperative, integrative approach. As Walton and McKersie (1965, p.179) 
noted: “it is possible for distributive bargaining to escalate into a deadly encounter […]. It is at 
this point […] that integrative bargaining may emerge”. Similarly, Pruitt and Carnevale (1993, p. 
114) noted that: “joint-concern and integrative behavior often develop as a result of insight into 
the fact that one is in a hurting stalemate.” Indeed, Harinck and De Dreu (2004) showed that 
temporary impasses reduce competition, increase problem solving, and thereby facilitate the 
development of integrative agreements.  
Obstacles Hinder Constructive Negotiation 
 In their analysis of the Oslo talks between Israel and the PLO in the early nineties, Pruitt, 
Bercovitch and Zartman (1997) note that “Each side agreed that the … that the best way to 
proceed was to draft a declaration of principles … This document specified that Israel would 
completely withdrawn from Gaza within two years … that there would be a Marshall Plan for 
Gaza; and that the final status of Jerusalem, borders, and the settlements, would be negotiated at a 
later date” (p. 179). Thus, parties postponed discussions about the most difficult obstacles – 
Jerusalem and settlements – and they focused first on easier issues.  
This practice during the Oslo talks reflects a common strategy among negotiators to talk 
about easy issues first and deal with obstacle issues later.2 Moving obstacles towards a later point 
in time is common advice given by negotiation experts (e.g., Cohen, 1980; Nieremberg, 1968). 
The idea is that once a certain amount of investment in time and money is made, the sunk-cost 
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fallacy affects negotiators and they feel obliged to pursue negotiating (Balakrishnan, Patton, & 
Lewis, 1993). Game theoretical analyses likewise suggest that “one should bargain on ‘easy’ 
issues first if implementation is sequential (Flamini, 2007). Doing so builds ‘bargaining 
momentum’ …” (Busch & Horstmann, 2002, p. 182). 
That obstacles hurt is consistent with studies in a variety of domains. Work on social 
cognition, and goal shielding in particular, showed that the activation of focal goals to which the 
individual is committed inhibits the accessibility, of alternative goals (Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & 
Sheeran, 2008; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002; Veling & Van Knippenberg, 2006). 
Resolving obstacles easily becomes a goal in itself, and through goal shielding leads negotiators 
to focus on this particular issue to the exclusion of additional issues. Work on social entrainment 
revealed that both individuals and small groups performed their tasks better when they began 
with a short time interval and moved on to successively larger time intervals, than when they 
began with longer and moved to shorter time intervals (e.g., Kelly & McGrath, 1985). This 
suggests that initial success facilitates subsequent performance, and that facing obstacles early on 
blocks such early successes and subsequent performance.  
Negotiation research also points to the negative effects of obstacles. First, a number of 
studies showed that loss-framed issues are more difficult to negotiate than gain-framed issues – 
negotiators make fewer concessions and less likely settle on issues that are framed as losses than 
as gains (e.g., De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 1994; Ockuysen, Galinsky, & 
Uptigrove, 2003). Group decision making research likewise shows that group members are less 
likely to settle when they differ on what options they find aversive, than on what options they 
find attractive (Nijstad & Kaps, 2008). Finally, work on value versus resource conflicts shows 
that the former type are more difficult and invasive and are more of an obstacle in reaching 
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agreement (e.g., Rapoport, 1960). Again consistent with the idea that obstacles hurt rather than 
facilitate agreement, value conflict more often ends in win-lose agreements while resource 
conflict more often ends in mutually beneficial, integrative agreements (e.g., Druckman, 1994). 
The Present Study: Hypotheses and Overview 
 Combining social cognition research and negotiation studies on temporary impasses 
suggests the “stepping back hypothesis” that facing obstacles lead negotiators to step back, attend 
to the bigger picture, see more interrelations among issues, and develop more creative, mutually 
beneficial agreements. Applied work in international and business negotiations combined with 
game theoretical analysis and findings on goal shielding, social entrainment, and group decision 
making all point to the “getting stuck hypothesis:” Negotiators focus on the obstacle issue to the 
exclusion of other issues, fail to see interrelations among issues, and they create negative 
emotions. This in turn undermines trust and the constructive climate required to negotiate 
integrative agreements. 
 To test these two hypotheses, we conducted experiments in which participants negotiated 
face-to-face about four integrative issues – they could be traded-off against one another to 
provide high mutual gain – and two distributive issues – both were equally valuable to each 
negotiator. The task was designed so that one distributive issue had high value, and the other low 
value, making the high value distributive issue a prominent obstacle. Issues were depicted in a 
table that showed for each issue and for each agreement level the point value to the individual 
negotiator (the partner’s values were not shown; see also below).  
We wanted to manipulate obstacles without altering the objective value of the issues, the 
structure of the negotiation task, or the (historical and reputation) context within which 
negotiators worked. To do so, we capitalized on the tendency in (western) society to read from 
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left to right. As a result of this basic tendency, items on the left are noticed, encoded, and 
retrieved better than items on the right, and are seen as more important and more critical (Dobel, 
Diesendruck, & Bölte, 2007; Maass & Russo, 2005; Spalek & Hammad, 2005). Thus, by placing 
the obstacle issue (the high value distributive issue) either in the left-hand or in the right-hand 
column of the payoff table (and the low value distributive issue thus in the right or left column, 
respectively), we increased versus decreased the likelihood that the obstacle issue became 
prominent in the negotiation. Put differently, we expected negotiators in the obstacle-to-the-left 
condition to begin with the obstacle issue earlier, and to experience its consequences more than 
those in the obstacle-to-the-right condition.  
Whether an issue is experienced as an obstacle or not may be influenced by whether or 
not negotiators were, after all, able to settle the issue. Whereas our focus in Experiment 2 and 3 
was on the consequences of obstacle placement on negotiation outcomes, we felt it important to 
establish first whether issue placement affects the perceptions of the issues as obstacles. This was 
done in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design. Undergraduate students (32 male, 42 female) received 5 
(approx. US$6.5) for participation. Participants were randomly assigned to dyads with the 
restriction that dyad members were unacquainted. Dyads were randomly assigned to the 
Obstacle-to-the-Left condition (N = 19), or to the Obstacle-to-the-Right condition (N = 18). 
Participant gender or dyadic gender composition had no effects.3 Dependent variables were 
difficulty of the most left (right) issue, the extent to which the issue was deemed an obstacle to 
reach agreement, and how valuable to issue was. 
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Procedure. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were asked to read an information 
package containing negotiation materials (role instructions, background information, profit 
sheets). Hereafter, participants were assigned to dyads and seated in separate cubicles in front of 
each other at a table, separated by a small partition preventing them from seeing each other's 
profit schedules. They began the negotiation, but after five minutes the experimenter returned, 
interrupted the negotiation, and asked participants to complete, individually and without 
consulting their counterpart, a short questionnaire. The experimenter returned a few minutes later 
and explained that the study was over. Participants were debriefed, paid, and dismissed.  
Negotiation Task and Manipulation of Obstacles. The task was based on De Dreu et al. 
(2006). Pairs of participants took on the role of union or management representatives who had to 
reach agreement on six issues: Salary, start date, duration of the contract, annual raise, medical 
coverage, and holidays. Each negotiator received a schedule that gave information about his or 
her profits (see Table 1). There were four integrative issues (start date, duration of contract, 
annual raise and medical coverage), and two distributive issues (salary and holidays). By 
logrolling (giving up on less valuable issues to maximize outcomes on more valuable issues) 
negotiators could integrate their interests. Full victory would yield 1300 points; a 50/50 
compromise on all issues would give 650 points per negotiator, and an integrative agreement 
would provide a total of 1640 points, with 820 points per negotiator (see Table 1). Negotiators 
were told that points represented lottery tickets, and that more points implied more lottery tickets 
and thus a higher chance on winning one of five prizes of 50 (because the negotiation was 
interrupted, during debriefing it was explained that all participants were given an equal chance in 
the lottery). 
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To manipulate obstacles we altered the placement of the obstacle (distributive) issue 
yielding between 0 and 540 points to each party. In the Obstacle-to-the-Left (Right) condition, 
both parties had this (most valuable) issue placed in the most left (right) column of their pay-off 
chart. (Placement of label [salary vs. vacation days] was varied orthogonally but had no effects.) 
Dependent Variables.  To assess whether issues were obstacles participants were asked, 
for each distributive issue, to rate “how long did you talk about this issue,” “how difficult was 
this issue to negotiate,” and “did this issue block progress”? (1 = very briefly/very easy/not at all, 
to 5 = very long/very difficult/very much). Ratings were averaged in an issue difficulty index ( 
= .73). In addition, we asked for each distributive issue “to what extent is this issue an obstacle 
for reaching agreement,” “without this issue, reaching an agreement would be much easier” 
(reverse coded), and “I see this issue as a barrier to reaching agreement” ( = .73). Finally, to 
ensure that participants did not bias the perceived value of the issue, we asked them for each 
distributive issue “how valuable is this issue to you, compared to the other issues on the table” (1 
= very low, to 5 = very high). 
Results and Discussion 
 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with obstacle placement between-participants and 
difficulty ratings of the left vs. right issue within-participants showed a trend for issue, F(1, 72) = 
3.42, p < .10,  = .19, and an obstacle placement x issue interaction, F(1, 72) = 4.18, p < .045,  = 
.31.4 The rated difficulty of the low value issue did not differ as a function of placement (M = 
3.17 vs. M = 3.14), F(1, 72) < 1, whereas the high value issue was rated more difficult when 
placed to the left, rather than to the right (M = 3.47 vs. M = 2.93), F(1, 72) = 7.68, p < .007.  
 ANOVA with obstacle placement between-participants and obstacle ratings of the left 
versus right issue within-participants only showed an obstacle placement x issue interaction, F(1, 
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72) = 7.33, p < .008,  = .36. The extent to which the low value issue was seen as an obstacle did 
not differ as a function of placement (M = 2.93 vs. M = 2.82), F(1, 72) < 1, whereas the high 
value issue was rated more as obstacle when placed to the left, rather than to the right (M = 3.07 
vs. M = 2.66), F(1, 72) = 9.02, p < .004. 
ANOVA) with obstacle placement between-participants and value ratings of issue 1 vs. 
issue 6 as within-participant factor showed only a strong effect for a trend for issue, F(1, 72) = 
18.83, p < .001,  = .41. Regardless of placement, low value issues were rated as lower in value 
than high value issues. This shows that obstacle placement had no effects on the perceived value 
of the issue but did influence the extent to which it was deemed a difficult obstacle.  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 confirmed that the left-to-right-bias makes issues placed to the left more of 
an obstacle in the eyes of the negotiator than placing these very same (difficult) issues to the 
right. In Experiment 2 we examined implications for joint outcomes, and assessed trust to 
examine the possibility that obstacle placement to the left creates less constructive processes and 
lower trust than placement to the right. Less trust associates with lower joint outcome (De Dreu et 
al., 2006). 
Method 
Participants and Design. Students (43 male, 51 female) received 5 (approx. US$6.5) for 
participation and were randomly assigned to dyads with the restriction that dyad members were 
unacquainted. Dyads were randomly assigned to the Obstacle-to-the-Left condition (N = 24), or 
to the Obstacle-to-the-Right condition (N = 23). Gender or dyadic gender composition had no 
effects.  
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Procedure, Negotiation Task and Manipulation of Obstacles. These were the same as in 
Experiment 1, except that the negotiation was not interrupted and participants had twenty minutes 
to negotiate; After the negotiation, they individually and independently filled out a questionnaire. 
Dependent Variables.  Issue difficulty was assessed as before. Joint outcomes were the 
sum of two dyad members’ outcomes across all issues (range between 0 and 1640, see Table 1). 
Trust was assessed with three items (e.g., “there was trust among the two of us,” “I feared to be 
exploited by my counterpart” [recoded], 1 = not at all, to 5 = very much;  = .83  
Results and Discussion 
 Obstacle Issues and the Left-to-Right Bias. ANOVA with obstacle placement between-
participants and difficulty ratings of the most left versus most right issue within-participants 
showed an effect for obstacle placement, F(1, 45) = 4.77, p < .034,  = .23, a trend for issue, F(1, 
45) = 2.89, p < .10,  = .24, and an obstacle placement x issue interaction, F(1, 45) = 19.03, p < 
.001,  = .54. Figure 1 shows that the difficulty of the low value issue did not differ as a function 
of placement, F(1, 45) < 1, whereas the high value issue was rated more difficult when placed to 
the left, rather than to the right, F(1, 45) = 16.62, p < .001. This replicates the results from 
Experiment 1. 
 Trust and Joint Outcomes. The Obstacle-to-the-Right condition produced more trust than 
the Obstacle-to-the-Left condition, M = 3.02 vs. M = 2.61, F(1, 45) = 5.48, p
 
< .024,  = .35. 
Furthermore, joint outcome was higher in the Obstacle-to-the-Right condition than in the 
Obstacle-to-the-Left condition, M = 1516 vs. M = 1445, F(1, 45) = 5.89, p
 
< .019,  = .34. These 
results support the “getting stuck” hypothesis and contradict the “stepping back” hypothesis. 
However, mediation analysis did not support the hypothesis that trust mediated the effects of 
obstacle placement on joint outcome. Trust and joint outcome were positively but not 
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significantly correlated, r(47) = .18, p < .24. In Experiment 3 we measured trust again to exclude 
a Type II error.  
  Experiment 3 
Central in the “getting stuck” hypothesis is that once negotiators confront an obstacle, 
zoom in on it to the exclusion of other issues, and fail to consider interrelations among issues. 
This suggests also that if one would be able to lead negotiators to adopt a global processing mode 
that helps them seeing the big picture, negotiators more easily overcome their obstacle issue, 
become more constructive, and develop more creative, integrative agreements. There are various 
ways to induce a global versus a local processing style, one being to focus individuals on 
temporally distal versus close events (see e.g., Forster et al., 2004). Indeed, negotiators who focus 
on temporarily distal events (e.g., 10 years from now) adopt a global processing mode, process 
issues simultaneously and see possibilities for trade-off more than negotiators who focus on 
temporarily close events (e.g., next month; Henderson, Trope & Carnevale, 2006). And 
consistent with the idea that a global processing mode facilitates dealing with obstacles, 
Ockhyusen et al. (2003) found that benefits versus burdens had less impact on negotiated 
outcomes when such outcomes were expected after a long time, rather than immediately. Thus, in 
Experiment 3 we tested the idea that the getting stuck effect is stronger under a local rather than 
global processing mode.  
In Experiment 3 we again tested the possible mediating role of trust, and also measured 
mood. Our reasoning was that negotiators facing obstacles might not perform as well because the 
difficult negotiation process creates less positive and more negative mood, which undermines 
flexible thinking and information processing (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; Hirt, Devers, & 
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McCrea, 2008). Thus, less positive and more negative mood might account for the effects on 
joint outcome.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants (50 males, 64 females) were compensated as before 
and randomly assigned to dyads and then to the conditions of a 2 (obstacle placement) x 2 
(processing mode) factorial. In addition to the measures taken before, we also assessed mood 
(anger, happiness, sadness). 
 Procedure and Negotiation Task. These were identical as before. 
 Manipulation of Processing Mode. After reading their negotiation instructions, 
participants were asked to assist in a short pilot study on “autobiographical forecasting.” Those in 
the local (global) processing mode condition were asked to write a short statement of about 10 
lines about how their upcoming Monday (Monday two years from now) would look like – where 
they are, what they are doing, with whom. Participants were given five minutes to write, and then 
asked to hand in their statement. Past work showed that this manipulation induces a local (global) 
processing mode that transfers to subsequent task performance (e.g., Forster et al., 2004). 
Hereafter the procedure was as in Experiment 2. 
 Dependent variables. In addition to trust, left-to-right-bias, and joint outcome, 
participants indicated their happiness, anger, and sadness (each three items, with 1 = not at all; to 
5 = to a great extent; s > .72).  
Results and Discussion 
Obstacle Issues and the Left-to-Right Bias. ANOVA with obstacle placement and 
processing mode between-participants and issue (issue 1 vs. issue 6) within-participants showed 
effects for obstacle placement, F(1, 53) = 5.02, p
 
< .029,  = .29, processing mode, F(1, 53) = 
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5.61, p
 
< .025,  = .31, and issue, F(1, 53) = 3.86, p
 
< .03,  = .26, an obstacle placement x issue 
interaction, F(1, 53) = 18.27, p
 
< .001,  = .51, and an obstacle placement x processing mode x 
issue interaction, F(1, 53) = 5.12, p
 
< .03,  = .29. Figure 2 shows that under local processing, 
rated difficulty of the low value issue did not differ as a function of placement, F(1, 53) < 1, 
whereas the high value issue was rated more difficult when placed to the left, rather than to the 
right, F(1, 53) = 19.64, p
 
< .001. Under global processing, however, no effect of obstacle 
placement emerged and the valuable issue was rated more difficult than the non-valuable issue, 
F(1, 53) = 4.87, p
 
< .05. This supports the left-to-right bias literature, and the idea that difficult 
issues to the left more readily become an obstacle. It also indicates that global processing 
overcomes this left-to-right bias. 
Negotiation Outcomes. ANOVA only revealed an obstacle x processing mode interaction, 
F(1, 53) = 4.87, p
 
< .032,  = .29. Figure 3 shows higher joint outcomes in the Obstacle-to-the-
Right, than in the Obstacle-to-the-Left condition when participants were in a local processing 
mode, F(1, 53) = 6.28, p
 
< .015. When participants were in a global processing mode, obstacle 
placement had no effect, F(1, 53) < 1, ns. Thus, the “getting stuck” hypothesis is valid when 
negotiators engage in local rather than global processing. 
Trust and Negotiation Strategy. Similar to Experiment 2, the Obstacle-to-the-Right 
produced more trust than the Obstacle-to-the-Left condition, M = 3.51 vs. M = 3.12, F(1, 53) = 
2.95, p
 
< .10,  = .22, but this time the effect was not significant. There were no other effects, and 
trust and joint outcome were not correlated, r(57) = .07, ns. Again, trust cannot account for the 
effects of obstacle placement on joint outcome. 
Negotiator Mood. ANOVA on happiness, anger, and sadness showed no effects for anger, 
all F(1, 53) < 1. However, negotiators in a global rather than local processing mode reported 
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greater happiness, F(1, 53) = 9.66, p
 
< .003,  = .39. This effect was qualified by a marginal 
processing mode x obstacle placement interaction, F(1, 53) = 2.73, p
 
< .10,  = .22. Table 2 
shows less happiness in the Obstacle-to-the-Left condition, than in the Obstacle-to-the-Right 
condition when negotiators were in a local processing mode, F(1, 53) = 4.06, p
 
< .05. When in a 
global processing mode, obstacle placement had no effect, F(1, 53) < 1. However, because 
happiness was not correlated with joint outcome, r(57) = .13, p < .35, happiness does not qualify 
as a mediator. 
 For sadness, ANOVA showed an effect for processing mode, F(1, 53) = 8.77, p
 
< .001,  
= .38, which was qualified by a marginal processing mode x obstacle placement interaction, F(1, 
53) = 2.93, p < .10  = .23. Table 2 shows greater sadness among negotiators in the Obstacle-to-
the-Left condition than in the Obstacle-to-the-Right condition when they were in a local 
processing mode, F(1, 53) = 11.61, p
 
< .001, but not when they were in a global processing mode, 
F(1, 53) < 1. Sadness was negatively correlated with joint outcome, r(57) = -.27, p < .05, but 
controlling for sadness as a mediator in the regression from joint outcome on the main and 
interaction effects of obstacle placement and processing mode only reduced the originally 
significant effect (p < .032) to marginally significant (p < .07), and the Sobel test was not 
significant, z = 1.32, p > .18. In short, we cannot conclude that mood states mediate the effects of 
obstacle placement and processing mode on joint outcome. 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 The idea that obstacles lead people to take a step back, engage in more global and abstract 
reasoning and focus on the big picture (Lewin, 1935; Higgins, 2006), ultimately becoming more 
creative, was not supported in the context of interpersonal negotiation. Rather, negotiators facing 
obstacles tend to get stuck, focus on the obstacle to the exclusion of other issues and their 
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interrelations, experience less trust, less happiness and more sadness, and they are less able to 
negotiate creative solutions to mutual benefit. These findings substantiate the advice offered by 
negotiation experts (e.g., Cohen, 1980), game-theoretic analysis (e.g., Busch & Horstmann, 2002) 
and in-depth case analyses (e.g., Pruitt et al., 1997).  
 Current findings make two other contributions. First, our findings add to the literature 
showing that people (in western society) process and visualize material from left to right more 
than vice versa (Maass & Russo, 2005). Across experiments, obstacles placed in the left-hand 
column of the issue chart had more impact, both psychologically and behaviorally, than obstacles 
placed in the right-hand column. The present results are among the first to demonstrate that this 
very basic and habituated tendency has interpersonal consequences and affects strategic decision 
making. Second, we replicate the original finding by Henderson et al. (2006) that negotiators with 
a distal rather than proximal time perspective engage in more constructive negotiation and 
achieve more integrative agreements. We also show that a distal time perspective helps 
negotiators to overcome obstacles – because they attend to the bigger picture and continue to 
consider interrelations among issues, negotiators are less likely to get stuck and more likely to 
develop creative, integrative agreements.  
 Whereas our findings suggest that difficult issues serving as obstacles not necessarily lead 
parties to take a more global perspective – as was hypothesized under the “stepping back” 
hypothesis – present findings do not exclude the possibility that some (difficult) issues in 
themselves trigger a more distal, global perspective. In fact, issues in the negotiation may co-vary 
with time perspective (Henderson et al., 2006) and it could be that when such issues are 
confronted early in the negotiation they promote global processing, helping negotiators to achieve 
mutually beneficial agreements. Future research could examine such possibilities.   
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 Our findings indicate that obstacles in negotiation generally impede progress and the 
achievement of creative solutions, but should not be taken as if obstacles never have the positive 
effects hypothesized by Lewin (1935). A starting point for further research may be the 
moderators of goal shielding, such as need for closure (Shah et al., 2002), construal level found in 
Experiment 2, or individual differences in concern for future consequences (e.g., Joireman, 
Kamdan, Daniels, & Duell, 2006). In addition, more work on the “stepping back” versus “getting 
stuck” hypothesis is needed in other areas than negotiation, at the least to see whether findings 
replicate. For example, our findings may have implications for work on how people deal with 
daily stressors (e.g., Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995). Daily hassles are often portrayed as short-term 
hurdles that need to be cleared in order to execute a more complex daily behavioral plan. Finally, 
individuals may face other types of obstacles than the difficult material issues in the current 
study. These include historical issues that impede negotiation (Bilewicz, 2007), or issues with 
strong symbolic value (Ledgerwood, Liviatan, & Carnevale, 2007) to name but a few. Future 
research could examine possible differences in the impact of material and immaterial obstacles in 
negotiation and social decision making. In the absence of such studies, we conclude that 
obstacles hurt negotiation. They focus parties on one issue to the exclusion of the others, and 
their interrelations, and prohibit parties to develop creative, mutually beneficial agreements. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1
 This research was financially supported by Grant NWO-400-07-701 awarded to the first 
author. We thank Wouter de Bruijn, Jens Forster, and Bernard Nijstad for their help at various 
stages of the project.  
2
 This advice contradicts the finding that negotiators achieve integrative agreements 
especially when they make multi-issue offers rather than single-issue offers and move towards a 
next issue only when the first is settled (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). However, Druckman (1977, 
p. 165) notes: “sequential agendas are often hard to avoid. Either the issues are too complex to be 
handled simultaneously, or they arise and must be resolved at different times.” Negotiators avoid 
multi-issue offering because of beliefs that such “horse-trading” discussions are inappropriate and 
that each issue should be considered on its own merits, because bounded rationality prohibits 
them from considering all issues and their interrelations simultaneously, and because sequential 
offering provides signaling power and strategic advantages (Schelling, 1960).  
3
  The experiment followed a study on individual choices; controlling for assignment to 
conditions in this prior experiment had no influence and this “variable” is further ignored. 
4
  Because participants interacted for some time, we verified that individual data were not 
statistically interdependent, and proceeded using the individual as the level of analysis (using the 
dyad as the level of analysis confirmed individual-level results). In Experiment 2 and 3, there was 
statistical interdependency and those data were analyzed at the dyadic level. 
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Table 1 
Profit Schedules for the Management and Union Representative 
 
      Management 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Salary   Start Date Duration of  Annual  Medical Holidays 
     Contract Raise Coverage 
 14.000 (540) 14 weeks  (90) 0,5 year  (240) 1% (270) 10% (120) 10 days (80) 
• 15.000 (450)  12 weeks  (75) 1,0 year  (180) 2% (225) 20%   (90) 13 days (60) 
• 16.000 (360)  10 weeks  (60) 1,5 year  (120) 3% (180) 30%   (60) 16 days (40) 
• 17.000 (270)   8 weeks    (45) 2,0 year  (60) 4% (135) 40%   (30) 19 days (20) 
• 18.000 (180)   6 weeks    (30) 2,5 year  (00) 5%  (90) 50%   (00) 22 days (00) 
• 19.000   (90)   4 weeks    (15)    6%   (45)    
• 20.000   (00)   2 weeks    (00)   7%   (00) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Union 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Salary   Start Date Duration of  Annual  Medical Holidays 
     Contract Raise Coverage 
 20.000 (540) 2 weeks    (270) 2,5 year (120) 7% (90) 50% (240) 22 days (80) 
• 19.000 (450)  4 weeks    (225) 2,0 year  (90) 6% (75) 40% (180) 19 days (60) 
• 18.000 (360)  6 weeks    (180) 1,5 year  (60) 5% (60) 30% (120) 16 days (40) 
• 17.000 (270)   8 weeks    (135) 1,0 year  (30) 4% (45) 20%  (60) 13 days (20) 
• 16.000 (180)   10 weeks    (90) 0,5 year  (00) 3% (30) 10%  (00) 10 days (00) 
• 15.000   (90)   12 weeks    (45)    2% (15)    
• 14.000   (00)   14 weeks    (00)   1% (00) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  Numbers in brackets refer to points earned by the participant. 
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Table 2 
Means and standard deviations for negotiator mood as a function of processing mode and 
obstacle placement (Experiment 3) 
 
Time-Perspective 
      _____________________________ 
Proximal   Distal 
     ________________________________________ 
Obstacle Placement  Left  Right  Left  Right 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure 
Sadness   3.33  2.95  2.45  2.72 
     (0.43)  (0.87)  (0.52)  (0.87) 
Happiness   2.59  3.22  3.40  3.41 
(0.66)  (1.06)  (0.90)  (0.99) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1 
Issue Difficulty as a function of Issue Value and Obstacle Placement (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 2 
Issue Difficulty as a function of Issue Value and Obstacle Placement under Local Processing 
(Top Panel) and Global Processing (Bottom Panel); Experiment 3 
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Figure 3 
Joint Outcome as a function of Obstacle Placement and Processing Mode; Experiment 3 
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